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Obligations and Penalties under Lemon Laws:
Automobiles versus Tractors
Terence J. Centner and Michael E. Wetzstein
Distinctive  new  provisions  of tractor  lemon  laws which  create  obligations  and  provide
penalties for defective self-propelled  agricultural equipment are contrasted with provisions
of automobile lemon laws.  Lemon-law obligations involve both  producers'  guarantees to
provide consumers  with a serviceable vehicle and  producers'  promises to remedy defects.
Due to fewer manufacturer obligations under the tractor lemon  laws as opposed to automo-
bile lemon  laws, tractors may be expected to have more defects than automobiles.  Yet the
tractor  lemon  laws  contain  fewer  penalties  in  the  form  of restitution  remedies.  The
inconsistences  of these obligations and penalties suggest tractor laws  may be inefficient.
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Introduction
Consumer dissatisfaction with the consumer  remedies provided by state commercial  laws
and the  federal  Magnuson-Moss  Warranty  Act  relating to  defective products'  led to the
enactment of state lemon laws in the 1980s (Greenberg;  LaManna;  Samuels, Coffinberger,
and McCrohan;  Vogel).  Many of the earlier consumer remedies  for defective products are
based  on  a  breach  of an express  or  implied  warranty2 and  involve  the  replacement  of
defective  items, the repair of the product during a specified warranty period, or the refund
of the purchase price (Chapman and Meurer). For some defective products, sellers are liable
for  incidental  and  consequential  damages  incurred  as  a  result  of the  defect  (Uniform
Commercial  Code).  Lemon  laws  were  designed  to  augment  these  remedies  and require
producer-manufacturers  to repair  defective products,  fulfill product  guarantees,  and take
back  defective  vehicles  or refund  the purchase  price.  Lemon laws  also  ease consumers'
burden of proof of defects (Norman; Vogel), encourage resolution of disputes without a trial
(Adams;  Dahringer  and  Johnson;  Kegley  and  Hiller;  Nicks),  and  simplify  refunds  for
defective  products  (Adams;  LaManna).  Although  lemon  laws  are  best known  for  their
warranty  coverage  of new automobiles,  new  and  expanded  provisions  also  cover  used
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As used in this article, defective products  include products with defects as well as products that do not meet the guarantees
of applicable warranties.
2State  warranty  provisions  generally  are  analogous  because  they were  adopted  from  a Uniform  Commercial  Code.  An
affirmation  of a product's quality constitutes  an  express warranty  (Uniform Commercial  Code § 2-313).  For merchants,  an
implied warranty of merchantability  accompanies the sale of a product unless excluded or modified and requires goods to pass
without objection  in the trade; be fit for ordinary purposes;  be of even kind and quality; be adequately contained,  packaged,
and labeled; and conform with promises made on the label or container (Uniform  Commercial  Code  § 2-314). A warranty of
fitness for a particular  purpose exists if, at the time of contracting, the buyer requested goods for a particular purpose, the seller
knew that the buyer needs the goods for a particular purpose, and the seller knew that the buyer was relying on the seller's skill
or judgment to furnish suitable goods (Uniform Commercial  Code § 2-315).Journal  of Agricultural and Resource Economics
automobiles,  leased  automobiles  (Adams;  Greenberg),  and tractors  (Centner).3 The  state
lemon  laws  may  be  grouped  in  two  major  categories,  one  for automobiles  and  one  for
tractors.
Probability  of product  defects creates  market  imperfections resulting  from the uncer-
tainty of defects, limited  information by consumers concerning the distribution of product
defects,  moral hazard,  and  negative  externalities  such as medical  expenses  and property
damage  accompanying  product  defects.  These  market  imperfections  prevent  a  Coasian
solution  (Coase).  Thus,  lemon  laws  were  established  providing  warranties  to  increase
product quality, augment remedies for a defect, and diminish the probability that a consumer
will receive a defective product (Cooper and Ross; Grossman; Priest). Smithson and Thomas
concluded that consumers place a relatively small value on lemon-law  protection because
consumers  do not believe  it is likely they will end up with a lemon vehicle.4 An expected
result of this consumer perception is  insufficient consumer demand  for product reliability.
The  low  consumer  demand  and  market  imperfections  provide  a  basis  for  governmental
market intervention  in the form of lemon laws with remedies for defective vehicles.
The issue addressed in this article concerns an optimal level of obligations and penalties
regarding defective vehicles as a policy instrument for improving market performance.  An
economic efficiency model of warranties based on a principal-agent model is developed with
the  state as the principal and the producer-manufacturer  as the agent.  Distinctions  among
obligations and penalties of the automobile and tractor lemon laws are investigated to show
the  effects of warranty laws  on producers'  incentives  for providing  conforming products.
Conforming products mean products with defects as well as products that do not meet the
guarantees of applicable  warranties.  The analysis  demonstrates  that as the obligations  of
producers  are weakened through more rigorous qualifications  for a defect, penalties in the
form of consumer remedies  associated with a defect should increase.  However,  the provi-
sions of the automobile  and tractor lemon laws  do not agree  with this model. The  tractor
lemon laws contain  fewer obligations due to more rigorous qualifications for a defect, yet
also  specify fewer penalties  than the automobile  lemon laws. This inconsistency  suggests
that the tractor lemon laws may be inefficient.
General Distinctions between Lemon Laws
The  laws  of the  four states  (Georgia,  Illinois,  Minnesota,  and Virginia)  that  have  both
automobile  and tractor lemon laws reveal two distinctive categories concerning  consumer
rights and defective  vehicles (Georgia Code Annotated; Illinois Compiled Statutes Anno-
tated; Minnesota Statutes  Annotated; Virginia Code Annotated). The first distinction is that
the  laws contain  dissimilar prerequisites  that curtail  lemon-law  obligations.  The  second
distinction  is that the laws contain dissimilar penalties regarding restitution remedies.
Prerequisites  Curtailing  Obligations
Lemon-law  obligations  involve both producers'  guarantees  to provide  consumers with a
serviceable  vehicle and producers'  promises  to remedy defects. Tractor lemon laws incor-
porate four prerequisites  that are not present in the automobile  laws to curtail obligations.
3Tractors  include other self-propelled agricultural  equipment such as combines.
4Legislative passage of lemon laws may be part of an effort for legislators to look good in the eyes of their constituents. Such
posturing may be unrelated  to the value of the benefits bestowed by the lemon laws  (Smithson and Thomas).
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Fewer  obligations  signify  less  producer  precaution  and  more  defective  vehicles  in  the
marketplace.
An initial prerequisite curtailing obligations is the definition of vehicles. The tractor laws
only cover new vehicles whereas many of the automobile laws also cover leased, demon-
strator, and reconveyed vehicles. For example, under the tractor lemon laws a manufacturer
could resell a  returned lemon tractor  without full disclosure  of its previous problems.  In
contrast, full disclosure is required to subsequent purchasers under many automobile lemon
laws.
A second  prerequisite  curtails  obligations  by limiting  penalties  to  a narrow  class  of
warranties.  Tractor  laws  cover  defects  of items  guaranteed  by  the producer  in  writing,
whereas consumers' recovery under the automobile lemon laws generally may be based on
an oral warranty, and in some cases, on an implied warranty. This prerequisite reduces  the
guarantees made by tractor producers with a concomitant reduction of situations whereby
consumers of tractors may qualify for restitution.
The lemon-law definition of a defect also curtails obligations. Three tests may be used
to classify an automobile as defective: the vehicle is unreliable, the vehicle is unsafe, or the
vehicle has a diminished resale value. In contrast, tractor lemon laws in Georgia, Minnesota,
and Virginia require the replacement of a lemon vehicle or refund of the purchase price only
if the defect substantially impairs both use and market value.  Thus, if a consumer bought a
tractor and an automobile, each with a safety problem that did not substantially impair the
vehicle's use  or market  value, the consumer  would  qualify for a  refund for the defective
automobile but not for the defective tractor. Similarly, the purchaser of a tractor with a defect
other than a safety problem that substantially impairs only its use or market value, but not
both, may not qualify for lemon-law relief.
A fourth prerequisite  involves aggregations  of different defects to calculate  an out-of-
service period. All automobile and tractor lemon laws stipulate  that if the  vehicle is out of
service due to repairs for more than a specific number of days, the consumer is entitled to a
replacement vehicle or a refund. Automobile lemon laws allow adding out-of-service times
from different defects. The tractor lemon laws require the same defect to preclude usage of
the vehicle for more than the prescribed period before a consumer may qualify for a refund
or replacement.
Remedies That Serve As Penalties
Restitution  remedies  suggest that the  automobile  lemon  laws provide  consumers  greater
relief than the tractor laws. Under the automobile lemon laws, a consumer who is entitled
to a replacement or refund is entitled to be reimbursed for collateral and  incidental costs.
These costs include sales taxes, financing charges, towing charges, and costs of obtaining
alternative transportation, but a reasonable allowance for consumer use of the lemon vehicle
is subtracted. The tractor lemon laws do not provide that farmers be compensated for towing
charges or the rental of other equipment while their new tractors are under repair.
The automobile  lemon  laws provide consumers more rights  than are  provided  by the
tractor laws under the dispute settlement provisions  set forth by the laws. First, the dispute
resolution procedure established by the Georgia and Minnesota tractor lemon laws encour-
ages informal settlement of disputes through industry-sponsored programs, whereas a state
5The Georgia  and Minnesota laws require  the defect  to substantially  impair use or market value, but an affirmative defense
would require both  to be impaired before  a consumer meets the statutory requirements for a refund or replacement.
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program under the automobile  lemon laws potentially offers  greater  consumer  relief.  As
related  by  Consumer Reports,  state-run  arbitration  programs  have  reported  consumer
success rates of 48-77%,  whereas  only  10-30%  of consumer actions  have been resolved
agreeably under industry-sponsored programs.6 Second, dispute settlement programs under
tractor lemon  laws  adopting  the  federal  procedure  enable  a manufacturer  to  prevent  a
consumer from making an oral presentation (Code of  Federal  Regulations). Third, automo-
bile consumers may have more rights in appealing unfavorable results. The dispute proce-
dures of the Georgia and Minnesota tractor lemon laws require  settlements  to be binding,
whereas the automobile laws of these states allow consumer appeals.
A loaned-tractor exception of the tractor lemon laws may negate replacements or refunds
for a defect. The exception declares that if a consumer is provided the use of another farm
tractor which is capable of performing  the  same  functions,  the prescribed out-of-service
period is tolled. This allows producers to provide  a substitute tractor so that the consumer
would never qualify for a replacement or refund (Centner). For example, if qualification for
relief was to be based on the vehicle being out of service  due to repairs for too many days,
the consumer could be loaned another tractor until the statutory term had expired. Thereafter,
any days the tractor was out of service after the statutory term had run would not count for
meeting the out-of-service period.  Moreover, a consumer might be loaned a tractor for the
remainder of the statutory term so that the vehicle would not break down enough times for
the consumer to qualify for relief.
Principal-Agent Lemon-Law  Model
The economic  efficiency of lemon laws may be investigated with a principal-agent  model.
To eliminate certain preventable accidents and preclude negative externalities from accruing,
the state acts as an agent for consumers inducing producers of vehicles to reduce the level
of defects.  Reducing  defects  is  costly,  and  in  the  long-run,  the  costs  are passed  on to
consumers.  Therefore,  the  state's objective  is to  design a warranty  law that  induces  the
producer to take socially efficient action (precaution).  In the literature,  this is  defined as a
principal-agent  problem  where  the  state  is  the principal  and  the  producer  is  the  agent
(Varian).  For modeling the lemon-law warranty provisions, the principal-agent  problem is
modified so  that the principal  employs a penalty  based  on warranty law  as opposed to a
payment.  Furthermore,  the objective of the state is solely to induce a certain action, which
does not include maximizing  the extraction of economic surplus from the producer.
Since lemon laws define conformity and specify what is guaranteed, a conforming vehicle
may  have  a  defect.  Let x c be the  monetary  value  for  a  set of defects  associated  with a
conforming vehicle and x,  be the monetary value for a set of vehicle defects where neither
set is observable at time of sale. The four lemon-law prerequisites imply  cltactors  > Xcautos
with the symbols Itacor and lautos referring to tractor and autos, respectively. Following Varian,
let a and b be possible levels of precaution that can be chosen by a producer out of some set
of feasible actions, A, which influence the probability of occurrence of xc and xn. Let va and
vb be the  costs  of precautions  a and b, respectively,  Tcb  denote  the probability  that xc  is
observed if the producer chooses precaution b, and let 7 nb = 1 - cb.  To provide incentives
In Georgia,  an Office  of Consumer Affairs offers  automobile  consumers assistance and a reasonably simple  procedure  to
assert  rights  against  manufacturers  of  lemon  automobiles,  whereas  no  corresponding  assistance  is  available  for  tractor
consumers.  Within  the  first 29  months of adoption of the Georgia  automobile  lemon law,  over  three  thousand consumers
contacted this office (Georgia Office of Consumer Affairs).
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for a producer  to take precaution  b, the  state may  levy certain penalties  s,.(x,)  and s,,(x,,)
associated with x,, and x, , respectively. These penalties may consist of restitution  remedies
in lemon  laws that outline  a producer's  duty to  establish  arbitration  mechanisms,  repair
vehicles,  or take back and replace a vehicle.  As addressed above,  the different restitution
remedies for automobiles and tractors result in s, ltr,,,a,,  < s  latos,. Assuming the state is risk
neutral, the state's expected returns if a producer chooses precaution b is
(1)  (Se.  -X.  )  cb  + (S,-  XJ  )2nth.
Assume a producer is risk averse and has the objective of maximizing a von Neumann-Mor-
genstern utility function with precaution costs entering linearly into utility, u. The producer
will choose precaution level b if the following incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied:
(2)  u(sc )  cbh  +  (s  ,, )1 ,,  n  + Vh  ￿  U(Sc )t  ca + U(S,  )7t na + Va,
and will choose precaution a otherwise  (Kreps; Varian).  The producer's optimal precaution
level will be determined given  the warranty  law that the state picks.  Although the state  is
not able to choose the producer's level of precaution directly,  it can influence the producer's
level through warranty law.
The producer's costs,  s,  s,,  and v,  are negatively related to utility. A warranty law with
high penalties for producing a defective vehicle can cause the producer to exit the market.
Assume  the level of disutility where the producer will not participate  is i.  The expected
utility from participation  must then be
(3)  u(s C)}c,h  + u(s, )n  b  + Vh < U.
Constraint (3)  is called the participation-individual  rationality or reservation level of utility
constraint. The producer may have other opportunities available that result in some reserva-
tion  level  of utility.  The  state  may  want  to  ensure  the  producer  receives  at  least  this
reservation  level. As discussed in Kreps, this formulation is far from general. A very special
form of a utility  function  is assumed  for the producer and the state  is assumed to be risk
neutral.  However,  the analysis  can be extended  to encompass  more general formulations
(Grossman and Hart).
The state's objective  is to maximize (1) subject to constraints (2) and (3).  Assume that
precaution  level  b results  from the optimal  incentive  scheme,  s,  and s,,  determined  from
maximum of (1).  Kuhn-Tucker  first-order conditions  for this maximum can be derived by
differentiating the Lagrangian, resulting in
(4)  .i  - Xu  (Si)  ib - PU'(Si)(7ib -ltia)=,  i=candn,
where Rand g are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (3)  and (2), respectively. Equation
(4) may be interpreted by dividing by u'(s,  )  i,,  and rearranging terms
(5)  +  =  [  1i+  l  ,1  7i  /,],  i=  c andn.
(5)
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Suppose  uI  = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint is nonbinding, then (5) implies that
u'(si) = 1 / X,  some constant. Penalty to the producer  is independent of the outcome,  xi, so
si is equal to some constant  s.  Substituting  s  into (2) and noting that probability distribu-
tions sum to one, yields
(6)  Va> V,.
This case where g = 0 can only arise when the precaution level that is preferred by the state
is also the low-cost action for the producer. When the incentive compatibility constraint is
binding,  [, ￿  0  , the costs to the producer will vary with the outcome.  The state desires a
precaution  level  that imposes high costs on the producer,  so the cost to the producer will
depend on the behavior of the likelihood ratio n  ca /  cb  This likelihood ratio measures the
likelihood of observing xc given that the producer chooses a to the likelihood of observing
xc given that the producer chooses b. A high value of the likelihood ratio is evidence that the
producer chooses a, while a low value indicates the producer chooses b.
Graphical Treatment
Following Varian, it is convenient for graphical treatment to reformulate the problem as one
with linear constraints and a nonlinear objective  function. Let ui be the penalty associated
with precaution level xi, u(si) = u 1, andf be the inverse of the utility function, si =J(ui),  i = c
and n. The largest possible utility that the state receives if it designs a scheme that induces
the producer to choose precaution level b is
(7)  v(b)= max[f(uc)-  c  cb + [f(u  )-Xn  ]Cnb
Uc  ,U.I
subject to
(8)  Ucicb  + Un7  nb  +  Vb  < Uc71 ca  + Uni na + Va,  and
(9)  uc  cb  ,+  Un  nb  + Vb 
<
The constraint  set determined by (8)  and (9) is illustrated  in figure 1. A producer choosing
precaution a or b has linear indifference  curves:
Ucn cb  + Unr nb + Vb  = constant,  and
Uc  ca  + Un  na + Va  =  constant.
The equality of (8)  corresponds  to the point where the producer's two indifference  curves
intersect.  Solving for uc at this equality yields
Va - Vb (10)  uc =u, +
cb - ca
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Figure 1.  Efficient penalties with a nonbinding incentive compatibility  constraint
represented  as the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  in figure  1. At every  point  on this
incentive  compatibility  constraint  the producer is  indifferent  between the two precaution
levels a and b. The region where precaution b is preferred by the producer is the region below
the line formed by (10). Below (10) the strict inequality  in (8)  holds, so the producer will
choose level  b. The shaded area  represents the area satisfying  the two constraints  (8)  and
(9).
The state's marginal rate of substitution, MRS,, is
f'(u,,  )T nb, MRS, =
The producer's MRSa is
MRS,  a  n
C  cb
When the penalties u, and u,, are equal, u  = u,,, as illustrated by the 45-degree line in figure
1, the state's and producer's indifference  curves are tangent. If the incentive  compatibility
constraint  is nonbinding,  the producer's  penalty  associated  with conformity  and noncon-
formity is constant. It does not vary if the producer conforms or produces a product with a
defect.
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Figure 2.  Binding  incentive compatibility constraint warranty legislation
If the state  exercised  its full  monopoly power,  the state  would extract  the reservation
value  of  utility.  This  represents  a  lump-sum  tax  on  the  producer  independent  of
whether the producer  conforms.  For a level of taxation  at or below this reservation  value,
the producer will always choose the desired precaution level b, because of (6). The producer
will maximize utility where  uc  = un = 0. At all points on this Pareto efficient cord the level
of nonconformity  is the same.  Only a shifting of economic  surplus between the producer
and the state occurs depending on the magnitude of this tax. Warranty legislation is generally
not used as a lump-sum taxation  method. Thus, no warranty legislation would be enacted
and the equilibrium is u,, = u,  = 0.
If the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, as illustrated in figure 2, the penalty
to the producer will vary with the outcomes xc and x,. The producer has the option of either,
adopting the lower cost precaution level a, va  < vb, and incurring penalty u, when a defect
occurs with probability Tna,  or choosing precaution level b and incurring cost  b,  and penalty
u,  with a lower probability  'n,,,. If the state exercises  its full monopoly power, point C,  u,
and  uC  are  the  threshold  levels  of penalties  where  the producer  is indifferent  between
precautions  a and  b.  In contrast,  the minimum level  of penalties  at  a  threshold level  of
disutility is u,  associated with u, = 0 in figure 2.
Inducing Precaution
Assuming  the  state  is solely  interested  in warranty  laws  to induce  producers  to  employ
precaution  b and not as a taxation  method, then the equilibrium threshold level  is  un  and
Uc
t
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u,. = 0. If a producer produces  a vehicle which conforms to the terms of the warranty law,
no  costs for repair or replacement  of the vehicle  are incurred as  a result of the warranty.
Alternatively, if  the vehicle does not conform with the warranty law, the producer will incur
an additional cost u,. This provides an incentive for decreasing the probability of  producing
a defect by employing precaution  b. If the state sets  u, below this threshold value  u>,  say
uS,,  the disincentive will not be sufficient to induce producer's adoption of desired precaution
b. Alternatively,  a level  above the threshold value  un  and still  satisfying the participation
constraint,  say  u,,  will  induce  producer's  adoption  of precaution  b.  If the  disincentive
becomes so large that the participation constraint is violated, the producer exits the market.
The threshold penalty  u,  is  influenced by the probability of vehicle conformity  given
precautions a and b. The ratio n ca /  b  is  0 < R  ca /  cb  < 1 and as this ratio approaches one,
the threshold u,  increases. As the probabilities of producing a conforming vehicle under the
alternative precautions converge, the penalty associated with the producer selecting precau-
tion a must increase  in order for the producer to be willing to adopt precaution b. Assuming
the  monotone  likelihood  ratio  property  from  the  regularity  conditions  in  the  statistics
literature,  a  relation  between  na /cb  and  x,  can  be  established  (Kreps;  Varian).  The
monotone likelihood ratio property requires that Tca /tnT  be monotone increasing in x,, which
also  results  in  un  monotone  increasing  in  L.  Considering  the  levels  of conformity  for
automobile and tractor lemon laws, as delineated by warranty legislation, automobile lemon
laws generally would induce fewer defects compared with tractor lemon laws. This implies
(11)  xc,,  autos < Xc I  tractors
Relatively  more tractors conform under the tractor lemon laws, but the level of defects  is
higher compared to the automobile lemon laws. Equation (11),  given the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property, results in
7 ca  |  ca
autos  I  tractorsv,
cbh  cb
which implies ul,,  tos < U  Itractors  . The current lemon laws for automobiles and tractors are
not consistent  with this result. Under current  laws, the level of penalty u, is reversed; the
tractor lemon laws require fewer remedies than automobile laws. As conformity standards
weaken,  a shift from automobile to tractor lemon laws, the threshold level of penalties  for
not taking the  state's preferred  level of precaution  should increase.  Instead the penalties
decrease,  penalties  under tractor  lemon  laws  are less  severe  compared with  automobile
lemon laws.
This inconsistency of the laws with economic efficiency suggests two possible scenarios.
First,  the  definition  of a  defect  under  automobile  laws  may  be  too  strong  in terms  of
increasing the probability of a defect, compared with the level of penalties for defects.  In
the alternative,  the  definition of a defect  in tractor  laws  may be too weak relative  to  its
associated penalties.  Smithson and Thomas provide evidence  as an aid in determining  the
likelihood of one scenario over the other. As an explanation for why consumers place a low
value on lemon laws, Smithson and Thomas note that the new arbitration mechanisms used
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by automobile producers  reduce the probability of consumers  taking actions under lemon
laws. This implies that the penalty u, associated with the automobile lemon laws is equal to
or greater than the threshold u,  Ia,,.o  Assuming automobile  lemon laws played a role in this
upgrading, the laws had the desired effect of inducing producers to adopt precaution levels
that significantly decreased the probability of a defect, precaution b.
Tractor lemon laws are relatively new, so no corresponding evidence as associated with
automobile laws is available. However, given relative higher likelihood ratios and lower u,
associated with tractors,  tractor producers do not have as strong an incentive to adopt the
preferred  precaution  b.  Thus,  the  probability  of being  below  the  threshold  Itracrs is
significantly  enhanced. If state legislators desire tractor producers to adopt similar precau-
tions  as  automobile  producers,  consideration  of changing  the  definition  of defects  and
increasing the penalties associated with defects at or near levels associated with automobile
lemon laws may be required.
Conclusion
In a broad context of overall  resource allocation,  when a Coasian  solution is not practical
due to market imperfections,  some form of governmental  intervention may improve social
welfare. Assuming governmental intervention in the form of lemon laws may improve social
welfare,  the  level of nonconformity  and  associated  penalties  should  be considered.  For
economic efficiency, a strong conformity law embracing specific obligations can be coupled
with  relatively  few penalties  in the  form of remedies.  As the  definition of conformity  is
weakened  and obligations  decrease, remedies  associated with defects should increase. As
evidenced by the current lemon laws for automobiles and tractors, this economically efficient
relation between obligations  and remedies  does not  always exist.  In particular, given the
inconsistent weak conformity definition for tractors associated with relatively few remedies
for defects, the probability  of current tractor lemon  laws providing  sufficient inducement
for efficient producer precaution is questionable.
[Received September 1994;  final version received March 1995.]
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